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Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 14491 “Socio-Technical
Security Metrics”. In the domain of safety, metrics inform many decisions, from the height of
new dikes to the design of nuclear plants. We can state, for example, that the dikes should be
high enough to guarantee that a particular area will flood at most once every 1000 years. Even
when considering the limitations of such numbers, they are useful in guiding policy. Metrics for
the security of information systems have not reached the same maturity level. This is partly due
to the nature of security risk, in which an adaptive attacker rather than nature causes the threat
events. Moreover, whereas the human factor may complicate safety and security procedures alike,
in security this “weakest link” may be actively exploited by an attacker, such as in phishing or
social engineering. In order to measure security at the level of socio-technical systems, one there-
fore needs to compare online hacking against such social manipulations, since the attacker may
simply take the easiest path. In this seminar, we searched for suitable metrics that allow us to es-
timate information security risk in a socio-technical context, as well as the costs and e ectiveness
of countermeasures. Working groups addressed di erent topics, including security as a science,
testing and evaluation, social dynamics, models and economics. The working groups focused on
three main questions: what are we interested in, how to measure it, and what to do with the
metrics.
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Introduction
Socio-technical vulnerabilities
Information security, or cyber security, is not a digital problem only. Humans have been
termed “the weakest link”, but also physical access plays a role. Recent cyber attacks cleverly
exploit multiple vulnerabilities of very di erent nature in the socio-technical systems that
they target. For example, the StuxNet attack relied both on Industrial Control System (ICS)
vulnerabilities and on the physical distribution of infected USB sticks, allowed by the business
processes in the target facilities [8]. With new developments such as cloud computing, the
attack surface of the systems only increases, and so do the options for potential attackers.
At any company in the service supply chain, there may be malicious insiders or benevolent
employees who fall victim to social engineering, and they influence the security of the system
as a whole significantly. In order to compare and prioritize attacks and countermeasures,
for example in terms of risk, the di erent types of vulnerabilities and threats need to be
expressed in the same language. The seminar on “Socio-technical security metrics” aims at
developing cross-domain metrics for this purpose.
Defining metrics
The idea of defining information security in terms of risk already appeared quite a while
ago [2, 10]. Since then, many metrics have been proposed that aim to define attacks and
attack opportunities in information systems in quantitative terms (see e.g. [7, 12]). Often,
likelihood and impact of loss are mentioned as the key variables, from which risk can then be
calculated. Furthermore, notions of vulnerability, di culty, e ort, cost, risk for the attacker,
and many more, show up in the literature.
Even in a purely technical setting it is not always clear how all these di erent concepts
are related. Still, including the human element forms a particular challenge, which deserves
a separate event and a better integrated community. Too often it is thought that models
of humans in the social sciences and models of technology are fundamentally incompatible.
This inhibits progress on some very relevant questions: How does sending a phishing message
compare to an SQL injection, in terms of the above mentioned variables? Or do we need
additional notions in the technical models to express the human elements, or in the social
science models to express the technical ones?
We thus need unified – or at least comparable – metrics that apply to all types of
vulnerabilities. In order to represent socio-technical attacks, the key concepts need to
apply to very di erent types of actions in an attack, including technical exploits and social
engineering alike. This requires knowledge on technical infrastructures, social science, and
actual incidents. To enable meaningful socio-technical security metrics, key features to be
addressed in the seminar are outlined below.
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Multi-step attacks
Cyber attacks, like StuxNet, tend to consist of multiple steps, combining technical and social
or organizational vulnerabilities. Attack trees [17] are often used to represent possible multi-
step attacks on systems, and they can be annotated with quantitative metrics. It has also
been proposed to develop formal analysis techniques and simulations (“attack navigators”)
that generate such trees based on a model of the socio-technical system at hand [5, 16]. By
defining methods to calculate metrics for attacks from metrics for steps, one can compare
the attacks in terms of the metrics, e.g. di culty. However, next to methods for prediction,
one would also want to be able to estimate the relevant parameters for the model based on
observed events. For example, if one observes a set of successful and unsuccessful attacks,
what does that say about the di culty of the steps involved, and how does that influence
the prediction of possible future events? Statistical methods from social science may assist
here [15].
Estimating metrics from data
Data is thus key to developing good metrics, but obtaining them requires care. Given the
data that is typically available in organizations already, including enterprise architecture,
network logs, and potentially even organizational culture, how to obtain the right metrics
from that data? What could be the role of “Big Data” in improving security metrics? And
how to acquire additional data in tailor-made experiments? From the modeling point of view,
a distinction can be made here between bottom-up approaches, leveraging existing data, and
top-down approaches, defining targeted data collection methods and experiments. A good
example on the social side are the phishing studies by Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz [6]. On the
technical side, intrusion detection systems may constitute an important source of data.
Attacker models
As security threats originate from attackers and not from nature, attacker models are key for
security metrics [9]. Attackers will adapt their strategies to the security situation, and also
to newly deployed countermeasures. We therefore need meaningful and measurable features
of attackers that can be used as a basis for the metrics. For example, the motivation of an
attacker may determine the goal of the attack, the resources available to an attacker may
determine the number of attacks that he can attempt, and attacker skill may determine
the likelihood of success. Costs of an attack as well as risk of detection influence attacker
behavior [3]. Again, the theoretical and empirical basis of such models needs to be carefully
studied, and (security) economics may provide important insights here.
Countermeasures
All these aspects come together in one final goal: supporting investments. In order to
estimate the cost-e ectiveness of security measures (also called ROSI, for return on security
investment), one would need metrics for both the risk prevented by the countermeasures,
and of their cost. The former could be calculated based on the properties discussed above.
The latter, however, is far from trivial by itself, as costs not only involve investment, but
also operational costs. Operational costs, in turn, may include maintenance and the like,
but an important factor in the total cost of ownership is impact on productivity. Security
features may increase the time required to execute certain tasks, and people have a limited
capacity for complying with security policies. If security is too cumbersome or misdirected,
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people will find workarounds, and this may reduce the e ect of the measures on risk [1].
Thus, metrics for countermeasure cost form an important topic in itself, requiring input from
the human factors and usable security domains.
Another application area for the metrics would be selection among alternative system
designs. For example, if two vendors o er the same equipment or service, but one is much
cheaper, how to take security risk into account when making this decision? Both vendors as
well as customers may be interested in security metrics from this point of view. However,
metrics would need to be designed carefully in order to avoid creating perverse incentives,
tweaking systems to score high on the metrics without actually being “better”.
Communities
In order to develop meaningful metrics for socio-technical security, participants from the
following communities were invited:
Security metrics and data-driven security, for obvious reasons;
Security risk management, to provide input on suitable risk variables to be included;
Security economics, to build upon economic theories of behavior of both attackers and
defenders;
Security architectures, to get relevant data on information system architecture and
incidents;
Formal methods, to analyze attack opportunities in complex systems;
Social / crime science, to understand attacker behavior and the influence of controls;
Human factors, to understand the impact of security controls on users.
Main findings
Paraphrasing some ancient philosophical questions (what is there, what can we know, what
should we do), we can structure the main outcomes of this seminar as follows:
1. What properties are we interested in?
2. What can we measure?
3. What should we do with the measurements?
What properties
One of the main outcomes of the seminar is a much better view on which types of security
metrics there are and for which purposes they can be used.
This leads to a distinction between metrics that exclude the real-life threat environment
(type I) and metrics that include the real-life threat environment (type II). Metrics describing
di culty or resistance are typically of type I. They give a security metric that is independent
of the actual activity of adversaries, or of the targets that they might be after. For example,
which percentage of the people fall for a simulated phishing mail. This is similar to what
Böhme calls “security level” [4]. The threat environment is often specified explicitly in such
metrics, and the metrics may thus enumerate threat types. However, they do not estimate
their occurrence rates, and in fact the occurrence rate is often controlled. In the phishing
case, the researchers control the properties and occurrence of the phishing e-mails, and
describe the e-mail (controlled threat) in their results.
Metrics describing loss (risk) or incidents are typically of type II. They describe undesired
events that happen based on interaction of the system with a threat environment (activity of
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adversaries), and their consequences. For example, the number of infected computers of a
particular Internet Service Provider [18].
An illustration of this di erence is the following. Consider two systems, system A and
system B [13]. In system A, a locked door protects e 1,000. In system B, an identical locked
door protects e 1,000,000. Which system is more secure? Or, alternatively, which door is
more secure? One might say that system A is more secure, as it is less likely to be attacked
(assuming the attacker knows the system). On the other hand, one might say that the doors
are equally secure, as it is equally di cult to break the lock. The former argument is based
on including an evaluation of the threat environment, the latter on excluding it.
Obviously, when trying to derive type II metrics from type I metrics, one needs metrics
on the threat environment as well. For example, when one wants to calculate risk related to
phishing attempts, and one knows how likely one’s employees are to fall for phishing mails
based on their sophistication, then one also needs information on the expected frequency of
phishing mails of certain levels of sophistication in order to calculate the risk. Such models
of the threat environment may be probabilistic or strategic (game-theoretic), representing
non-adaptive and adaptive attackers, respectively. Probabilistic models, in turn, may be
either frequentist (based on known average frequencies) or Bayesian (based on subjective
probabilities). The various points of view have not been fully reconciled up to this point,
although integration attempts have been made [14].
Another consideration is the integration of security metrics from di erent domains: digital,
physical and social. Often, there are di erent styles of type I metrics, which one would like
to integrate in a single type II metric representing the level of risk in a socio-technical system
(e.g. an organization). Digital metrics may represent di culty as required skill (e.g. CVSS),
physical metrics may use required time (e.g. burglar resistance), and social metrics may use
likelihood of success (e.g. likelihood of success of phishing attempts). Integration of these
metrics is still an open challenge.
What measurements
The seminar discussed methods applied in di erent scientific communities for measurement
purposes. Some of those methods rely on quantitative indicators, some rely on qualitative
indicators, and some combine both. A further distinction can be made between subjective
and empirical metrics, e.g. expert judgements versus monitoring data. Hereafter, and for the
purpose of illustration, we have drawn a non-comprehensive list of such methods. They can be
applied individually or in a complementary way, covering one measure or combined measures.
A specific usage we consider underrepresented so far is the combination of methods in an
e ort to augment the measurement quality, or to provide information about the validity of a
new measure. This approach has often been referred to, during the seminar, as triangulation
of measures.
These are social methods discussed in the seminar:
semi-structured interviews; in-depth interviews; surveys;
observations of behavior;
critical incident analysis;
laboratory experiments; field experiments;
expert / heuristic analysis / cognitive walkthrough;
root cause analysis.
These are technical methods discussed in the seminar:
security spending;
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implemented controls;
maturity models;
incident counts;
national security level reports;
service level agreements.
It is important to assess which type of metric (type I or type II) is produced by each
of the techniques. For example, penetration testing experiments produce type I metrics,
whereas incident counts produce type II. Maturity models and national security level reports
may be based on a combination of type I and type II metrics. In such cases, it is important
to understand what the influence of the threat environment on the metrics is, in order to
decide how the metrics can be used.
What usage
Security metrics can contribute to answering questions about a concrete system or questions
about a design (hypothetical system), and questions about knowledge versus questions about
preferences. Here, we focus on a simpler distinction, namely between knowledge and design
questions. In the case of knowledge questions, metrics are used to gather information about
the world. In the case of design questions, metrics are used to investigate a design problem
or to evaluate the performance of a design, such as a security control. In terms of knowledge
questions, a typical usage discussed is a better understanding of the human factor in security.
In terms of design, possible questions are how much security feedback a system should give
to users or operators, or how to provide decision support for security investment.
Security metrics may have several limitations. In particular, many metrics su er from
various forms of uncertainty. It may be unclear whether the metrics measure the right
thing (validity). Even if this is the case, random variations may induce uncertainty in the
values produced (reliability). It is therefore important to understand the implications of such
uncertainties for decisions that are made based on the metrics. Triangulation may contribute
to the reduction of uncertainty. In some cases, quantitative metrics may not be possible at
all, and qualitative methods are more appropriate.
Another limitation is that stakeholders may behave strategically based on what they know
about the metrics (gaming the metrics). If stakeholders are rewarded when their security
metrics become higher, they may put e ort into increasing the metrics, but not “actual
security”. Even if the metrics are valid under normal circumstances, this needs not be the
case under strategic behavior.
Conclusions
Security is di cult to measure, which should not be a surprise to those involved. However,
to understand security in today’s complex socio-technical systems, and to provide decision
support to those who can influence security, rigorous conceptualisation, well-defined data
sources and clear instructions for use of the metrics are key assets. This seminar laid the
foundations for understanding and applying socio-technical security metrics.
In particular, we strove for clarity on (a) the di erent types of security metrics and their
(in)compatibility, (b) the di erent sources and methods for data extraction, and (c) the
di erent purposes of using the metrics, and the link with types, methods and sources. Several
papers are planned as follow-up activities, as described in the reports of the working groups
(Section 4). On many topics there are di erent views, which may not always be compatible,
as was clear from the panel discussion (Section 5). Future follow-up seminars would be very
valuable to address the open problems (Section 6).
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3 Overview of Talks
3.1 Metrics for Security Awareness?
Zinaida Benenson (Universität Erlangen – Nürnberg, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Zinaida Benenson
The usefulness of measures for raising security awareness in organizations and for the general
public is controversially discussed in the current IT security research and practice. The
di erences in opinions range from publishing detailed guidelines for panning and conducting
security awareness campaigns to reasoning that most security awareness measures are
pointless. Measuring the e ectiveness of security awareness interventions is an important
tool for resolving this debate. Unfortunately, approaches from the computer science and
information systems literature are not su ciently well developed to fulfill this task. Moreover,
the state of the art does not clearly define security awareness, which makes measuring
anything connected to this concept even more di cult, if not impossible.
An attempt to characterize the existing security awareness definitions according to three
orthogonal dimensions “Knowledge about threats”, “Knowledge about protection mechanisms”
and “Behavior” is presented in this talk. Its purpose is to understand what security awareness
actually means and what is missing in the current research on this topic. A preliminary
version of this systematization can be found in the joint work with Norman Hänsch [1].
References
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3.2 The National Role of CS Metrics
Kas P. Clark (Ministry of Security and Justice – The Hague, NL)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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The Dutch government needs the help of the research community to develop better, quantit-
ative cyber security metrics for use at the national level. What data do we need and how
can we combine it together to form coherent, relevant cybersecurity indicators?
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3.3 Normative Security
Simon N. Foley (University College Cork, IE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Joint work of Foley, Simon; Pieczul, Olgierd; Rooney, Vivien
Main reference O. Pieczul, S. N. Foley, V.M. Rooney, “I’m OK, You’re OK, the System’s OK: Normative Security
for Systems,” in Proc. of the 2014 Workshop on New Security Paradigms Workshop (NSPW’14),
pp. 95–104, ACM, 2014.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2683467.2683476
The increasing scale and complexity of modern computer systems means that the provision
of e ective security is challenging, as well as being prohibitively expensive. Consequently,
security tends to regulate those activities perceived to be critical, with the assumption that
other unregulated activities, whether known or unknown, are not of significance. An added
complication with security regimes that are overly strict, is that such unregulated activities
can become the means of getting things done in the system. However, the di culty is that
these side-activities often lead to the compromise of security in a system. While security
controls may provide monitoring and enforcement of the critical activities related to the
security policy, little may be known about the nature of the other activities.
Normative security seeks to view a system as a society in which security is achieved by a
combination of legislative provisions and normative behaviors. Drawing solely on legislative
provisions is insu cient to achieve a just and orderly society. Similarly, security regimes that
focus solely on security policies and controls are insu cient. Our position is that systems
have analogous normative behaviors – behavioral norms – whereby the security of a system
is based not only on the regulation of what is perceived to be its security critical activities,
but also on the orderliness of its unregulated activities.
Using this analogy we are exploring how current theories about social norms in society
can provide insight into using normative behavior in systems to help achieve security. We are
investigating how these behavioral norms, representing potentially unknown side-activities,
can be revealed by mining detailed system logs. The assumption is that, absent other
information, adherence to past normative behavior can be taken as some indication of
continuing orderliness. However, we note that these behavioral norms can be used to gauge
the order or disorder in a system and, therefore, adherence to past normative behavior may
also indicate a continuation of disorderliness
3.4 Socio-Technical Security Metrics
Aleksandr Lenin (Technical University – Tallinn, EE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Aleksandr Lenin
Joint work of Lenin, Aleksandr; Willemson, Jan
The talk outlines the socio-technical metrics used by the so-called “Failure-Free” models
for quantitative security analysis, describes the problems obtaining quantitative input data
from expert estimations, as well as suggests approaches that may be used to deal with the
complexities of socio-technical security metrics.
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3.5 Attack Trees and Socio-Technical Trees
Sjouke Mauw (University of Luxembourg, LU)
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In this presentation I sketched two tree-based modelling formalisms: attack trees and
socio-technical trees. I briefly highlighted their syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
3.6 Security-Related Behavior and Economics
Frank Pallas (KIT – Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference F. Pallas, “An Agency Perspective to Cloud Computing,” in J. Altmann, K. Vanmechelen, O.F.
Rana (eds.), “Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services – Proc. of 11th Int’l Conf.
GECON 2014,” LNCS, Vol. 8914, pp. 36–51, Springer, 2014.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14609-6_3
The application of economic theories and concepts to the field of information security has led
to important findings and insights throughout the past years. In particular, the role of the
yearly Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 1 deserves explicit mention here.
From an economic perspective, achieving better information security does in most cases
require cooperation between di erent players who pursue di erent goals. This cooperation,
in turn, is hallmarked by information asymmetries, externalities and therefore often counter-
productive incentives that lead to unfavourable security outcomes for all involved parties.
In particular, this is the case when ultimate security-related decisions and activities are
delegated from one party to another one which is assumed to have better capabilities and/or
better situational knowledge allowing for more appropriate outcomes. This does, for example,
apply to all security instruments focused on individual users as well as to most scenarios of
cloud computing.
1 See http://econinfosec.org
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As laid out in the talk, economic agency theory provides valuable insights on the fun-
damental characteristics shaping such settings, the respective conflicts of interests and the
reasonableness of di erent countermeasures. Socio-technical security metrics, in turn could
be employed to diminish agency-related ine ciencies. In particular, they could in the future
play an important role in the context of signalling (e.g. audit certificates), screening (e.g.
inspections), and monitoring.
3.7 Comparison of Cloud Provider Security
Sebastian Pape (TU Dortmund, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Joint work of Pape, Sebastian; Paci, Federica; Jürjens, Jan; Massacci, Fabio
Suppose, you want to start a new service and have the task of selecting a cloud provider.
How do you determine which one is most secure? How do you decide which data is helpful
for the selection? There already exist some approaches, but each of them (more or less)
has its own utility function. How do you decide which approach returns the best results for
ranking / comparison? Obviously the solution depends on the requirements of the tenant. Is
it possible to come up with a ’requirement independent’ ranking?
3.8 Metrics for Security Behaviour in Organisations
Simon Parkin (University College London, GB)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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In this short presentation I discuss monitoring of security behaviour in organisations, looking
at user compliance and non-compliance, and the appropriateness of the security imple-
mentation for users and the business. I then discuss directions for measurement, including
articulating incentives and costs for organisations to measure security behaviour, and the
approachability and packaging of socio-technical expertise for practitioners and business in
education and tools.
3.9 Metrics in social engineering experiments
Wolter Pieters (TU Delft, NL)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Wolter Pieters
Joint work of Bullée, Jan-Willem; Montoya, Lorena; Pieters, Wolter; Junger, Marianne; Hartel, Pieter
Main reference J.-W. Bullée, L. Montoya, W. Pieters, M. Junger, P. Hartel, “The persuasion and security
awareness experiment: reducing the success of social engineering attacks,” Journal of Experimental
Criminology. January 2015.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11292-014-9222-7
In social science, experimental setups can provide information on the risk associated with
attack steps that involve social engineering, i.e. the manipulation of people. Typically, the
threat environment is controlled by executing carefully scripted actions, which may involve
phishing e-mails but also real-life interaction. One example of such an experiment is the
“persuasion and security awareness experiment”, in which we measured the success rate of
obtaining physical credentials from university employees. It was found that a combined
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awareness intervention was e ective in reducing this success rate. Other possible metrics may
include the time taken until success, or the stage in which the attack succeeds (if the script
supports multiple stages). In this way, social science experiments with controlled threat
environments can provide information on the di culty of social engineering attack steps,
and the e ect of interventions. Because the threat environment is controlled, the metrics
obtained are independent of actual attacker activity, which is not the case in studies that
measure actual victimisation.
3.10 Metrics for Security of Cooperating Systems
Roland Rieke (Fraunhofer SIT – Darmstadt, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference R. Rieke, “Abstraction-based analysis of known and unknown vulnerabilities of critical information
infrastructures”, International Journal of System of Systems Engineering (IJSSE), 1(1/2):59–77,
2008.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJSSE.2008.018131
Systems of systems that collaborate for a common purpose are called cooperating systems.
They are characterised by freedom of decision and loose coupling of their components. Typical
examples of cooperating systems are electronic health systems, vehicular ad hoc networks,
distributed air tra c management systems, telephone systems, and electronic money transfer
systems.
In this talk, three problems with respect to security metrics for cooperating systems have
been addressed, namely, (1) abstract representation of security information, (2) security
information quality, and (3) elicitation, linkage, and management of security information.
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3.11 Three challenges with respect to measurement from a risk
perspective
Ketil Stolen (SINTEF – Oslo, NO)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Ketil Stolen
One challenge is the gap between the data or information required by methods and tools for
risk analysis put forward in main stream academic publications and the data available in
practice.
A second challenge is the communication of risk relevant information among humans.
What scales are best suited for what purpose? In particular, how should we measure likelihood
and uncertainty?
A third challenge is the validation of risk models. How to determine that a risk model is
su ciently reliable?
3.12 Ideas for Socio-Technical Security Metrics
Axel Tanner (IBM Research GmbH – Zürich, CH)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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To induce discussions, four ideas for potential socio-technical security metrics are presented:
Graph based: as many models used or proposed for security analysis, e.g. in TREsPASS,
are based on graph structures, with additional data on nodes and edges, could we use
graph characterising parameters, like connectivity or centrality, possibly in combination
with data like ’value’ on nodes and ’resistance’ on edges to build and define security
relevant metrics?
Coverage based: many processes and operations happen in every organisation – can we
measure what part of these is covered by operations and automated security policies? Or
what part is covered by information flowing into tamper-proof log files?
Reality gap: out of the security policies covering processes and operations in an organisa-
tion – how many and to which degree are these actually fulfilled in reality?
Time to detect: in case of a breach of a security policy – how long will it take to detect
this non-compliance?
3.13 Susceptibility to Social Engineering
Sven Übelacker (TU Hamburg-Harburg, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Sven Übelacker
In my short presentation I discussed my research on factors influencing the susceptibility to
social engineering attacks which I try to categorise via existing research. Beside factors like
socio-demographics, knowledge, impulsiveness, or stressors, I focused on the question: How
big is the impact of personality traits on this susceptibility? I talked about my ongoing work
on a scenario-based social engineering questionnaire including many of the aforementioned
factors.
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3.14 How should we measure implementation complexity?
Jan Willemson (Cybernetica AS – Tartu, EE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Jan Willemson
One of the weakest points in computer security are the implementations. The amount of
potential mistakes correlates with complexity of the application. Should we acknowledge
application complexity as one source of insecurity? Should we design a measure for this?
Some examples of implementation complexity:
Highway speed limits do not guarantee the globally optimal outcome (e.g. that the total
time needed for everyone to get home is minimal), but they have a virtue of being easy
to follow and easy to verify.
The definition of safe elliptic curves by Dan Bernstein and Tanja Lange includes several
criteria that are designed to minimize the risk of getting the implementation wrong.
3.15 Playing poker for fun, profit and science
Je  Yan (Newcastle University, GB)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Je  Yan
I propose to use poker as a new instrument for studying the psychology of deception, which
is fundamental to many security and cybercrime problems such as social engineering. Poker
enables the studies of a wide range of deceptive behaviours, and in these settings, observable,
measurable and computable metrics are often available. Moreover, poker o ers better
ecological validity than trust games that have been widely used in economics studies.
I also explore how to inform cyber security with poker research, and discuss experiments
designed for this purpose.
4 Working Groups
4.1 Models, Economics and Threats – Working Group Report
Tristan Caulfield, Kas Clark, Trajce Dimkov, Carrie Gates, Cormac Herley, Mass Soldal
Lund, Sjouke Mauw, Roland Rieke, and Je  Yan
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Sjouke Mauw, Roland Rieke, and Je  Yan
In the cyber security domain, policy makers in both the public and private sectors make
decisions regarding which project to fund, which legislation to propose and how to increase
the overall resilience of their respective society or company given their finite resources. These
decisions are made based on the best information available that given moment. Generally
speaking, these decisions are based on qualitative metrics, such as expert or public opinion.
Some policy makers, including the Dutch Parliament, have o cially asked that the
existing metrics are supplemented with quantitative metrics. The underlying assumption
is that quantitative metrics are more reliable as they are impartial and less susceptible to
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anecdotal evidence. This working group is interested in exploring the available metrics and
creating a framework to organize and evaluate them. To this end, this working group will:
(1) identify relevant socio-technical security metrics, (2) estimate the desired properties of
these metrics and (3) define a taxonomy to organize and correlate these metrics.
4.2 Social Dynamics Metrics – Working Group Report
Zinaida Benenson, Sören Bleikertz, Simon N. Foley, Carlo Harpes, Stewart Kowalski, Gabriele
Lenzini, Daniela Oliveira, Simon Parkin, Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, Paul Smith, and Sven
Übelacker
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Introduction
Individuals continually interact with security mechanisms when performing tasks in everyday
life. These tasks may serve personal goals or work goals, be individual or shared. These inter-
actions can be influenced by peers and superiors in the respective environments (workplace,
home, public spaces), by personality traits of the users, as well as by contextual constraints
such as available time, cognitive resources, and perceived available e ort.
All these influencing factors, we believe, should be considered in the design, implementation
and maintenance of good socio-technical security mechanisms. Therefore, we need to observe
reliable socio-technical data, and then transform them into meaningful and helpful metrics
for user interactions and influencing factors.
More precisely, there are three main questions that the group discussed:
1. What data do we need to observe and what of this data we actually can observe and
measure?
2. How can we observe and measure?
3. What can we do with the results of the observations?
What do we need to (and can) observe?
General data and metrics for individuals and groups
The discussion converged towards the idea of observing elements of behavior, not knowledge
or attitudes, as the latter are not considered reliable indicators of security-related behavior.
These observations can focus on behavior at an individual or group level.
Additionally to observing behavioral elements, e.g. patterns, we need to understand which
factors influence people’s behavior and trigger actions, and how to measure them. Among
possible factors are personality traits, including irrationality and heuristics in decision-making.
For example, deception susceptibility (or resilience) is an important personality trait that
has been studied in the psychology of persuasion. The group also discussed measuring moral
dimensions and risk perception. Other possible metrics include habits and cognitive abilities.
Collecting socio-demographic data such as age and sex is also important in order to know
how these characteristics relate to other observable data.
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Data and metrics for organizations
In the context of organizations, the group discussed what data and metrics can be used to
indicate, estimate and quantify the security culture of the organization, its behavioral norms,
risk perception (from the organization point of view), national di erences, and the level
of commitment of the group and individuals to the organization’s goals. Metrics relating
to individuals’ capacity to expend e ort for organization security without a perception of
personal benefit (their ‘compliance budget’ is also important, as the employees can experience
a number of draws from the security mechanisms on their available e ort).
Data and metrics for adversaries
In the adversary domain, the group discussed metrics on attackers’ risk perception of the
possibility of being caught. Other possible metrics are organizational defense strengths as
perceived by the attackers and attack resource costs (time, money and cognitive e ort).
Data and metrics for employees
Collecting data on employees’ privilege levels and roles is important, as this information
helps to identify potentially dangerous deviations in behavior. Regarding employee activity,
especially in the context of insider attacks, important metrics discussed were artifact collection
rate per employee (number of artifacts per hour, week, and day), number and size of files
transferred (flash drive, other local machines, remote machines), and number of artifacts
printed.
Unintentional mistakes (such as accidentally printing out a document that is not allowed
to be printed) or intentional workarounds in cases where security measures are perceived as
impediments to task execution (such as sharing of login credentials) can mislead inferences
about the prevalence of malicious insider behavior, indicating misconfigured systems and
unusable security mechanisms instead. Therefore, it is important to develop metrics that
can reduce false positives and lead to adjustments of security mechanisms. These metrics are
especially related to organizational culture in terms of learning from mistakes, how mistakes
are treated and reported, and also to individual metrics such as level of commitment and
risk perception.
Limitations and future work
The group did not have enough time to discuss metrics for the general public and society,
and also for special groups such as software developers, system administrators or managers,
leaving these metrics to future work.
How can we observe and measure?
Most of the mentioned data can be collected using qualitative and quantitative methods from
social sciences and psychology, although some data have technical nature (such as artifact
collection rates). Quantitative methods include field and laboratory experiments, large-scale
observations of behavior and carefully designed surveys, whereas qualitative methods include
semi-structured interviews and in-depth observations (e.g., ethnography). Quantitative
methods can be used to collect descriptive statistics as well as to test hypotheses.
Researchers and practitioners should pay attention to the constraints and limitations of the
respective methods, such as external and internal validity and generalizability. Observations
in organizations are challenging because it will usually take time before a relevant number of
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events is collected. However, this approach represents probably the most natural means of
measuring security behaviors.
What can we do with the results of the measurements?
Good social dynamics metrics support decision-making in an organization, improve its security
processes and promote visibility of security policies. They also help with the communication
of security needs at the high level of the organization, thus influencing the company’s security
budget.
Provide appropriate security
Security provisioning over time is important – stable metrics can allow baseline measurement
of security before changes are made. This allows managers and providers to objectively
measure elements of behavior over time to determine if end-users are being adequately
supported.
Communicate human factors evidence
Social dynamics metrics can provide a common language that has the potential to support
engagement with technology-oriented security researchers and practitioners. This common
language would communicate the value of considering human factors in the design and
implementation of future security solutions. Further, this common language would help
to better frame the expectations and requirements for security training programs and
security policies within organizations. We need both, social and technical metrics, as only a
combination of them can provide enough supporting evidence for the design of better security
processes.
Understand the appropriation of security
Social dynamic metrics also help discovering optimal levels of feedback about the security
state of a system and of the control that the users can and should have over the security
means. One possibility is the personalization of user engagement in security depending on
their personality traits and experience (at the individual or per-task level, depending on
the qualities of a task or group of tasks). Some people may wish to defer choices about
security to the technology and receive minimal feedback (we call this black box security),
whereas some other people may wish to have a lot of control and detailed feedback (white
box security).
Next steps
The group discussed the importance of studying metrics for specific domains and producing
a generalized framework for social security metrics, as some metrics will be valid for several
domains or perspectives. A subset of the working group agreed to continue research within
this area and to consolidate findings towards producing publications that support researchers
and practitioners. This group includes Zinaida Benenson, Carlo Harpes, Stewart Kowalski,
Gabriele Lenzini, Daniela Oliveira, Simon Parkin, and Sven Übelacker.
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4.3 Testing, Evaluation, Data, Learning (Technical Security Metrics) –
Working Group Report
Rainer Böhme, Michel Van Eeten, Simon Foley, Dina HadûiosmanoviÊ, Aleksandr Lenin,
Sebastian Pape, and Wolter Pieters
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Questions and objectives
The WG session started by brainstorming potential research questions around the topics of
security evaluation and testing using security metric. Some of the questions were:
What are di erent types of (technical) security metric?
What kind of outcomes can we expect using di erent types of security metric?
What kind of metric can be used for evaluation/testing purposes?
What kind of data is required for using specific types of security metrics?
The WG then focused on two concrete objectives: (i) identify di erent dimensions to
characterise a security metric and (ii) discuss the existing metrics with respect to the
identified dimensions.
Properties of security metric
Böhme [2] presents a framework characterising security levels with di erent indicators mapped
across the level of abstraction (as concrete or abstract) and the amount of probabilistic nature
in measuring (as deterministic or probabilistic). The framework represented an excellent
starting point for the WG discussion on di erent types of security metrics. For example,
security spending represents an abstract but deterministic measure of security investment
(i.e., as it represents the total spending). By contrast, specific protection measures represent
concrete and deterministic measure (i.e., as they provide concrete technical checklists which
can be directly related to security vulnerabilities). In this context, incident counts represent
concrete yet probabilistic measure (i.e., as it reasons on the level of security based on the
outcomes).
During the WG session, we introduced another aspect of the characterisation: inclusion
of threat environment. More specifically, indicators like protection measures and penetration
testing do not consider specific threat environment into the measure (as they mainly focus
on the system itself). On the other hand, incident counting implicitly includes the specific
threat environments (i.e., by referring to attackers and specific attack vectors).
Security metrics in practice
To understand how metrics used in practice map to the theoretical framework, the WG
focused on discussing several approaches for measuring the security level:
Security service level agreement The agreements are typically used by security-service pro-
viders to indicate the scope and the character of the provided security service. Commonly,
the agreements include guarantees on service availability (e.g., 99%), the maximum time
for incidents response (e.g., 30 minutes) and repair time (e.g., 3 business days) [1].
Maturity models Organisations use maturity models to evaluate the overall level of security
awareness and technological implementation of the organisation. Common approaches
include maturity models like O-ISM3 [4], OpenSAMM [6] and BSIMM [3]. The models use
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combinations of checklists to indicate the estimated level of security in the organisation
or in software. For example, ‘’have a lightweight approach to risk classification and
prioritization” corresponds to the first (lowest) maturity model regarding architecture
design, while “build proactive security architecture” corresponds to the fourth (highest)
maturity level in architecture design.
Government-driven security level assessment Di erent countries annually publish a gen-
eral, nation-wide, report on the cyber security level. One such example is the Cyber
Security Assessment in the Netherlands, published by National Cyber Security Centre
(NSCS) [5]. As the input information, the report uses incidents across di erent industry
and public domains to draw the threat landscape, current trends and predictions.
Observations
With respect to the security metric framework, the WG discussions on the existing security
metrics resulted in the following observations:
Security service level agreements and maturity models represent metrics which weakly
include threat environment into consideration (by focusing on protection measures) while
security assessment reports largely include the threat environment (by using incident
statistics).
Metrics which do not consider the threat environment focus on security controls (e.g.,
protection measures).
Metrics which consider the threat environment focus on evaluating the existing security
controls (e.g., incidents indicate the accuracy of protection measures).
Risk distribution in metrics is directly related to the inclusion of the threat environment.
For example, security metrics in service level agreements focus on specifying controls
(e.g., response time), and avoiding risk of guaranteeing the level of attack impact.
A desirable security metric should include indicators across the whole spectrum of
measurements (i.e., w/ and w/o threat environment).
Follow up
As the follow up activity, the participants of the WG agreed to revision the initial framework
by introducing more practical examples and case studies, and exploring new possibilities for
measuring the security level (e.g., measuring botnet/malware mitigation, measuring outcomes
of penetration testing).
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Figure 1 An illustration of the design cycle used in design science.
4.4 Security as a Science – Working Group Report
Roeland Kegel, Vincent Koenig, Frank Pallas, Kai Rannenberg, Ketil Stølen, and Axel Tanner
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This working group initially focused on identifying the type of research that is done in
computer science in general, in an attempt to answer the question what kind of science
does computer security as a research field practice? The discussions that followed from this
question led to the conclusion that security research involves answering both knowledge
questions and design questions:
Knowledge questions are the archetypical form of science designed to answer specific
questions by way of experimentation. The added value of answering these questions
comes in the form of knowledge about the world as it is.
Design questions are challenges: A call to change the world by introducing a new artefact
in a certain context. This is something designed to improve the context into which it
is introduced, such as a faster search algorithm, a test methodology or a new software
system.
To define a scope for the discussion that fits the aim of the seminar, we then focused
on design science and the role it plays in answering the following questions: what can we
measure, how do we measure it, and what can we do with these measurements? We found that
we could map these questions to elements of the design cycle illustrated by Wieringa [1] (see
Figure 1). The design cycle corresponds closely with the engineering cycle of investigation,
design, implementation and evaluation.
Metrics and the Design Cycle
The design cycle uses metrics in di erent stages of the cycle. Below is a summary of these
relationships:
Problem investigation: In this stage, problems and stakeholders are identified. Comple-
tion of this step results in a clearly defined problem. As such, the question what do we
measure? can be answered using the results of this step.
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Treatment design: In this stage, the solution (new artefact) is designed to solve or
mitigate the problem. The result of this step is a blueprint of the solution. By considering
this proposed solution, we can find guidelines on how to measure, since the implementation
guides what measurements are possible/practical.
Implementation: In this stage, the proposed solution is inserted into the context. This
corresponds to an application of the chosen security metrics.
Evaluation: Finally, in this stage we consider the e ects of applying this solution to the
context. Using the measurements performed in the previous step, we can now consider
the question what to do with these measurements.
Having identified the relationship of these questions and the design cycle, we can now
reason about the issues with using the design cycle with security.
Problems and Pitfalls when using the Design Cycle
We identified three problems with the use of this cycle within the context of security research:
Invalidation by anecdote: Often, a proposed treatment for a problem is invalidated by
anecdotes, the availability of which being random. As a result, the random absence of
anecdotes (i.e., the absence of proof for invalidation) might be confounded with the proof
that no such anecdote exists (i.e., the proof of absence of arguments that could invalidate
a treatment). Systematic evidence, supported by metrics, should however be sought for
invalidation: a single counter-example to a security measure will lead to redesign of the
treatment and only the proof of absence of such counter-examples will validate a design.
Skipping problem identification: After the proposed treatment is deemed unsatisfactory,
the problem is often not reconsidered. The treatment is immediately adapted to incor-
porate a defense to the anecdote. However, such counterexamples might be indicative of
an incorrect problem investigation. Care has to be taken not to skip this step without
due thought being given to the matter.
Problem considered static in following cycles: When an iteration of the design cycle
is complete and problems are identified with the current solution, often the problem
definition is not reconsidered. Subsequent iterations of the process should consider
whether the gathered evidence suggests that the problem identification needs updating
(because of changing requirements, or identified shortcomings).
We feel that these problems are typical in security research. Good socio-technical security
metrics can o er valuable support to mitigate these problems, especially for systemising the
invalidation by anecdote rather than relying on random availability of anecdotes.
Conclusions
We feel that metrics should play a larger role in supporting treatment validation, lowering
the reliance on randomly available anecdotes to validate (often expensive to implement)
treatments. Additionally, we feel that metrics can play a vital role in reassessing whether
the solution has proven successful. Finally, we are interested in the question of whether the
design cycle is an e ective methodology to use in the development of these metrics, rather
than just the evaluation. To this end, as future work, we intend to use a case study in order
to further investigate the interactions between design science and security metrics.
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5 Panel Discussion
At the end of the seminar, a panel discussion was organized with the following participants:
Sasse, Martina Angela (moderator)
Gates, Carrie
Herley, Cormac
Pfleeger, Shari Lawrence
Stølen, Ketil
The panel helped identify fundamental di erences in metrics, as well as open problems.
It discussed a variety of key points as represented hereafter.
Definitions
The first discussion focused on defining what we need when intending to measure human
behaviour in a security context. The panel suggests defining
what behaviours we can expect to see;
what triggers behaviours;
what the range of behaviours is;
what behaviours we want to encourage or discourage;
what the di erences between individual and group behaviours are;
what triggers for sharing are;
what attitudes lead to what behaviours.
The panelists identify an additional challenge which is understanding when people want
to be in control, and when they want ‘to be taken care of’ in terms of security.
Data and research methods
The second point of discussion regarded the di culty to rely on the ‘right’ data and the
right methods for producing such data. There is a gap between the data that is required,
and what is available – one reason being that data capture techniques originate from safety
and process industry, where capturing data is much simpler than in cyber security.
The panel focused on the di culty of getting reliable data; they formulated the following
problems and recommendations:
Use metrics that are as explicit as possible;
People collecting data need hands-on experience of risk analysis – this is currently often
confused with requirements analysis;
Predict risk level after changes have been implemented;
Combine risk analysis with other techniques to check risk model;
Use two risk models – before and after;
Combine with other measures, e.g. vulnerability scans, to check predictions – program
and functional testing.
The panel agreed that there are many ways of measuring risk, e.g. attack trees; the ISO
27000 2-factor measure of risk consequence and risk likelihood; or by quantifying the ability
of threat – e.g. OWASP risk rating methodology.
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Transition to practice
It is felt that research methods can contribute to gathering reliable data. The transfer from
research to practice however is di cult and might be very slow. To illustrate how distant
research and practice might sometimes be, the panel provides a set of statements meant to
describe the “industry view”, as opposed or distant to the research view:
“Social metrics are hard and expensive, which is why we don’t do it”;
“Security awareness – we assume that it works if people pass the test” (we want to believe
it works);
“Testing is hard and expensive to do” – technical responses are easy and cheap, and work
‘well enough’ – so people buy them – measuring sta  ‘grumpiness’ is not easy and cheap;
“We prefer capital expenditure to consultancy” – results need to be easy and cheap to
measure;
“It’s very hard to resist a good test” – people test and measure what’s easy to test and
measure;
“Standards drive adoption”.
In addition, the following observations were made:
‘Best practices’ are not quickly updated;
Gartner and other influencers have a lot of power – everybody wants to be ‘best of breed
& forward looking’ quadrant;
As far as socio-technical security metrics are concerned, the phrase “garbage in, garbage
out” applies;
The industry approach to measurement is insu ciently mature – it’s a vacuum that
research could fill;
Honest and authoritative tests and criteria are needed.
The usage of metrics is another important point of discussion and the panelists feel that
metrics and numbers are used to justify decisions already made. It is thus unsure why we
want the measure. The answer ought to be: we should spend on things that have value for
the system overall, not just to prevent something bad from happening, which is also the
argument of Harvey Molotch [1]. We must combat exceptionalism – ‘security is special’ – as
this seems to be an excuse for not working along scientific principles.
Also, we should not measure proxies or shortcuts. Examples:
Studies on how many users give their passwords for a chocolate bar – these are numbers
that don’t tell us very much;
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) studies: the composition of participant groups is often limited,
and motivation of those who participate for very little money may be to complete the
study as quickly as possible.
The panelists feel there are too many of this type of debatable study – and bad data drives
out good, myths about user behaviour are perpetuated. These hide the need to consider if
technology and policies are actually working.
Finally, the panel agrees on a series of concrete recommendations and take-home messages:
Be honest about what you don’t know;
Throw out data that is not grounded, and start with what is left over;
Triangulate your measurements or results with other metrics;
Look at multiple metrics, especially context metrics, to understand what is causing
changes in metrics;
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Relate your measurements to business metrics to understand cost and benefit of doing
the measurements;
Question how good the metric is. Are any of the insights actionable?
Conclusion
We need to work together to develop better studies, experimental paradigms, data collection
and analysis techniques, and standards of proof and evidence.
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6 Open Problems
Despite interdisciplinary e orts, progress in socio-technical security is still slow. Research
and practice are relying on security approaches that are felt to be unsatisfactory, but we
are currently lacking demonstrably better alternatives. This seminar has made important
contributions to advancing understanding, developing ontologies and identifying key issues,
but much more research is needed in this domain. The following open problems have been
identified:
Reconciling metrics based on cost, time, and probability;
Analysing security of complex systems based on attack step metrics;
Relation with economic metrics;
Relation with privacy metrics;
Application to specific domains, such as critical infrastructures;
Simulation of socio-technical systems;
Defining “good” policies that are not only oriented towards liability but well grounded in
what really happens in companies; that also rely on an understanding of human behavior
rather than a prescription of behavior only;
Triangulation of metrics;
A clear definition of what socio-technical means, as opposed to the sum of two systems
with di erent rules and concepts.
In particular, we recommend a follow-up seminar on analyzing the security of complex
socio-technical systems based on metrics.
7 Relation with previous seminars
This seminar builds on the Insider Threat series (08302, 10341, 12501) and the seminar
Secure Architectures in the Cloud (11492). However, this new seminar is focused on risk and
security metrics, which is a specialized topic that can be of value to a broader community,
and as such does not belong to the series.
Other related seminars include Verifying Reliability (12341), and From Security to De-
pendability (06371). Furthermore, a GI Dagstuhl Research Seminar on Dependability Metrics
was held Oct. 30 – Nov. 1, 2005 (http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-540-68947-8/
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 Sunday 30-11 Monday 1-12 Tuesday 2-12 Wednesday 3-12 Thursday 4-12 Friday 5-12 
       
7:30 – 8:45  Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast** 
9:00 – 10:30  Introduction Pitches Mid-seminar review Pitches Summary 
10:30 – 10:45  Short break Short break Short break Short break Short break 
10:45 – 12:15  Pitches Working groups Working groups Working groups Follow-up activities 
12:15 – 13:30  Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch 
14:00 – 15:30  Working groups Results from WGs 
Social event 
Results from WGs Departure 
15:30 – 16:00 
Arrival* 
Short break Short break Short break  
16:00 – 17:45 Tutorials Demo session Panel discussion  
18:00 – 19:00 Dinner Dinner Dinner Dinner  
19:30 – 21:00 Arrival* Social event Meet / socialise Meet / socialise  
21:00 - Wine and cheese Wine and cheese Wine and cheese Wine and cheese Wine and cheese  
 
 Colour coding: Non-seminar Working groups   
* Dagstuhl staff present 15:00 - 19:00  Food and drinks Special sessions   
** Please check out before 9:00  Talks High-level   
 
Figure 2 The programme of the seminar.
page/1). These seminars covered broader classes of metrics, not specifically focused on secur-
ity or socio-technical integration. The present seminar brings together the socio-technical
security angle from the Insider Threat series and the focus on metrics of the above mentioned
seminars.
In the Lorentz Center in the Netherlands, a related seminar took place on Formal Methods
for the Informal World (http://www.lorentzcenter.nl/lc/web/2013/531//info.php3?wsid=
531). In this seminar, formal models of socio-technical systems were discussed, although not
primarily focused on cyber security.
8 Programme overview / Organisation
In an e ort to foster exchange among the participants and take full advantage of the Dagstuhl
seminar concept, the organizers purposefully defined a program without long ex cathedra
talks (Figure 2). The aim was twofold: (1) put emphasis on short presentations, involving a
broad variety of people, each followed by su cient discussion time; (2) avoid the style of
presentations that are given in other contexts and that focus more on reporting rather than
on sharing new ideas, visions, questions. As a result, the program included the following
activities:
24 pitches (short talks, focusing at new ideas, visions, major questions);
3 tutorials (same objective than pitches, with increased talking and discussion time; suited
for topics that are felt shared across the participants);
3 demo sessions (focus on concrete use-cases, video material, etc.);
1 panel discussion;
4 working groups (parallel break-out sessions; see Section Working Groups).
Furthermore, the parallel activities have been complemented by plenary sessions in order
to present results to the entire group of participants and facilitate discussing those results.
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